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Abstract: This essay examines translations of the Kurdish epic poem Mem û Zîn into Turkish, tracing
the logics behind these state-sponsored translations and examining how acts of translation are also
efforts to regulate, translate, and erase Kurdish subjectivities. I argue that the state instrumentalizes
Mem û Zîn’s potent nationalist currency in order to disarm present and future claims of Kurdish
national autonomy. Using translation as a counterinsurgent governmental tool, the state attempts to
domesticate Kurdish nationalist discourses even as it reproduces them, thereby transforming Kurdish
nationalism into a specter of itself. Attending to this specter, however, allows us to see how these texts
resist domestication: conjured by the state’s technologies of counterinsurgency, the specter circulates
as an inassimilable insurgent, an affect of resistance, the kernel of alternative social imaginings.
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O Lord! You know that poor Xanî
Is captive like the pen
His heart is truly in your hands
His hand is certainly out of his hands
Yareb! Tu di zanî Xanî’ye jar
Teşbîhê bi xameya girîftar
Qelbê wî di dest tedaye elheq
Destê wî di dest xwe nine mitleq
–Ehmedê Xanî, Mem û Zîn
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T

he classic tale of Mem û Zîn, written by Kurdish poet Ehmedê Xanî in
approximately 1692, tells the story of two star-crossed lovers named Mem and Zîn
from different cities in the same region of Kurdistan. Mem and Zîn fall in love at the
celebration of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year, but Beko, the villain, prevents their
romance by imprisoning Mem for over a year. In prison, Mem is on the verge of death
when Zîn finally is able to see him. Mem dies soon after, and Mem’s friend Tajdîn
beheads the villain Beko. Soon thereafter, Zîn dies of sorrow while weeping over Mem’s
grave. Zîn is then buried in the same grave with Mem, and Beko is buried at their feet;
although “love flowered from the earth” (“şîn bû ji zîraeta evînê”) of their grave, the
body of Beko sprouts a thorn bush that grows amid the flowers.
Writing in the northern dialect of Kurdish known as Kurmancî, Xanî’s poetic rendition of
this recurrent oral tale is framed by hundreds of verses about the richness and beauty of
the Kurdish language. In one early chapter, titled “Our troubles” (“Derdê me”), Xanî
exhibits what seems to be a very striking awareness of the powerful linkages between
language and the formation of political community:
Da xelq-i nebêjitin ku Ekrad
bê me ‘rifet in, bê esl û binyad.
Enwa ‘ê milel xwedan kitêb in
Kurmanc-i tenê di bê hesêb in.
(1996, 170-2)

So that people won’t say that the Kurds
have no knowledge and have no history.
Nor that all sorts of people have their books
and only the Kurds are lacking.

Xanî goes on to comment on the rich literary traditions in both the Ottoman and the
Safavid Persian Empires, asserting that the Kurdish language also offers the possibility of
a vibrant and colorful literature, and he connects this to the political conditions of the
time:
Ger dê hebuya me îttîfaqek
vêk ra bikira me inqiyadek
Rum û ‘Ereb û ‘Ecem temamî
hem’yan ki me ra dikir xulamî.
(1996, 168)

If we had unity among us
if we listened to each other
all of the Romans and Arabs and Persians
they would all be our servants. 1

Xani’s writings, and particularly this chapter, have been a useful source for Kurdish
intellectuals and nationalists because they lend “a prophetic aura and historical
legitimacy” to the Kurdish national project (Strohmeier 2003, 29). This chapter, for
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instance, was published in the first issue of the literary journal Kürdistān in Cairo in 1898
(Strohmeier 2003). Also in the 1890s, another Kurdish poet named Hacî Qadrî Koyî, a
vociferous nationalist, reads Xanî’s book as “the book of our nation” [kitêba milletê me]
and places himself within the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism as the inheritor of Xanî’s
literary and nationalist legacy (van Bruinessen 2003, 50). Kurdish writers since then,
such as Celadet Alî Bedirxan and Mehmed Uzun, have relied upon Xanî’s text in order to
historicize claims to Kurdish nationhood and to legitimize Kurdish autochthony in the
region (Strohmeier 2003; Uzun 2006a, 2006b, 2007; see also van Bruinessen 2003).
Uzun, perhaps the most celebrated Kurdish-language writer of the 20th century, praises
Xanî for “[placing] national consciousness and feelings into the lives of Kurdish people
with poetic expression” (2006b, 27). Similarly, based upon Xanî’s book, Kurdish scholar
Amir Hassanpour makes the claim that Kurdish nationalism was one of the earliest
instances of nationalism’s emergence in the world (1992). Over the course of the 20th
century, then, Mem û Zîn contributed to the formation and development of contemporary
Kurdish nationalism, and in turn, this nationalist reading of Mem û Zîn has become the
most dominant approach to the text.
In this article, I examine a number of transfigurations of Mem û Zîn: (1) the first
translation into Turkish published in 1968, (2) a translation published in 2010 by the
Turkish Ministry of Tourism and Culture, and (3) a television adaptation that ran from
2012-2013 on the state-owned and operated Kurdish language channel TRT Kurdî
(formerly known as TRT 6). The first of these generated significant controversy and led
to a five-year long series of trials for the translator. Conversely, the latter two were
heralded in the media and by the state as positive developments in overcoming the
ongoing ethnic tensions and strife between Turks and Kurds, a conflict that is the
perpetual thorn in the side of the Turkish national project—so much so that it is
impossible to imagine Turkish nationalism without the threat posed by Kurdish
nationalism and the Kurdish question at large.
The impulse to regulate language has been a central element of nation-building and the
consolidation of an ideal citizen-subject since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in
1923, and the Kurdish language was marginalized, forbidden, and criminalized in this
process. As a consequence, the Turkish state’s so-called “Kurdish opening” (“Kürt
açılımı”), which began in 2008, and its concomitant negotiations with(in) Kurdish, should
be approached critically. Much of the contemporary discussion of Turkey’s Kurdish
language policy by human rights organizations and civil actors has been framed through
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narratives of democratization and pluralistic humanism, wherein the state’s patronage of
Kurdish cultural production and the translation of Kurdish artifacts into Turkish are the
means by which Kurds supposedly gain rights, cultural capital, citizenship, and equality
under the law. This teleological narrative of inevitable progress from violent and antidemocratic tribalism towards a humanist, capitalist society overlooks important dynamics
of state power, discipline, and control. In fact, as I will argue, the legal sanctioning and
subsequent emergence of these new, so-called autonomous avenues toward Kurdish
‘freedom’ are an expansion of existing governmental technologies; they are insidious
mechanisms of domination that render themselves invisible by providing the illusions of
choice and mobility through the possibility of limited recalcitrance. As Mitchell Dean
writes, “contemporary liberal rule rediscovers freedom as a technical modality, and is
able to translate (even if only roughly) the concerns of social and cultural movements
into its own vocabulary” (Dean 1999, 155, emphasis mine). This article, accordingly, is
concerned with such acts of discursive translation into the “vocabulary” of the state.
I would first like to begin by providing a brief account of some of the pivotal factors of
Kurdish language politics in Turkey in order to contextualize the status of Kurdish
language cultural production today. Then, I will examine the 2010 translation of Mem û
Zîn commissioned by the Ministry of Tourism and Culture as it relies upon and departs
from the 1968 translation of the text into Turkish. Given the state’s sensitivity regarding
the Kurdish language, its decision to commission the translation of a book like Mem û Zîn
suggests that more complex dynamics are at play than mere notions of pluralism and
geographic kinship. Why should the state feel compelled to draw attention to a cultural
artifact that historicizes claims to Kurdish autonomy? Subsequently I will analyze the
television show, In the Shadow of Mem û Zîn (“Siya Mem û Zîn”), and the ways that it
departs from and restages the romance of the two main characters in order to disarm and
transfigure the nationalist treble of the story into one that corroborates the Turkish
national project. I argue that the show is a unique manifestation of a highly complex and
still-evolving governmentality, one that privileges consumerist multiculturalism as a
vehicle for remaking Kurdish viewers into obedient, disciplined, neoliberal subjects of
the Turkish state. How does the show, as a translation—an “afterlife” (Benjamin 1968,
71)—attempt to unravel the nationalist promise of Mem û Zîn and reimagine the affective
geography of Kurds in Turkey?
I will conclude with a theoretical meditation on how these translations are a symptom of
the neoliberal transformation of state and society, and how they spectralize discourses of
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Kurdish nationalism. I define the specter here as an indistinct yet persistent trace that
manifests out of a subsumed subaltern history; it is an affective relic of that which is
always disappearing but has never fully departed. The specter is a useful concept for
understanding these translations within the framework of Turkish state governmentality
precisely because it shows us that language and national identity are constantly under
construction, and it attends to the inevitable recurrence of a Kurdish nationalist
subjectivity as that which is “neither living nor dead, present nor absent” (Derrida 1994,
63). The spectral recurrence of Kurdish nationalism shows that even neoliberal efforts to
assimilate the Kurds—through the simulation of cosmopolitan tolerance and the illusion
of (limited) cultural autonomy—has not succeeded in laying to rest the Kurdish question.
The specter, then, is both symptomatic and constitutive of neoliberal multiculturalism,
even as it compels us to contemplate other possible presents and futures.
Linguistic Nationalism in the Turkish Republic 2
As mentioned, the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish language have always troubled the
discursive promise of a homogenous Turkish nation, compromising the integrity of
Turkish geographies and the totalizing promise of the Turkish language. Because
speaking the Kurdish language was the most easily discernible difference between Kurds
and Turks, the roots of Republican Turkey’s policies of ethnic homogenization extend as
far back as the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The claim that Kurds have no separate,
unique language or history can be found, for example, in the aggressive nationalist
discourse of the Young Turks (Jön Türkler) who came to dominate the Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP; in Turkish, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in the first decade of
the 20th century. The CUP conducted sociological research that, according to
Zeydanlıoğlu, was used “in order to justify the Turkification of Anatolia in general and
the Kurds in particular” (2012, 101).
After the foundation of the Republic, the Turkish language reform of the 1920s and
1930s was intended to consolidate, purify, and streamline the Turkish language in what
Nergis Ertürk describes as “extreme self-surgery,” given the excess and the deep
radicalism of the changes that were made (2011, 87). For Ertürk, the language reform in
Turkey was responsible for fomenting a deep internal fear of the linguistic other, who
was codified as and associated with death in early Republican nationalist literature: as she
argues, “modern nationalism, in the Turkish context as elsewhere, is prone to destructive
violence precisely in its suspicion of its own origin in a translative vernacular” (88). The
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necessary creation of the other, based upon linguistic difference, was therefore crucial to
early Republican era politics and has played a large role in the ongoing violence against
minorities in Turkey. Official recognition of the Kurdish question as a problem
challenges the state’s century-long vision of linguistic and territorial homogenization
(Yeğen 2011, 123). Consequently, it is useful to examine that century-long vision and its
turning points in order to critically approach the state’s interest in the contemporary
translation of Kurdish texts into Turkish.
In the late 1920s, just a few years after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a group of
law students in Istanbul initiated a movement known as the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!”
campaign, which received significant support from the state because it aligned so closely
with official language policies and helped disseminate such ideologies at the individual
level (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012, 103; Dickinson 2014, 121). The state also sanctioned and built
education and cultural centers called “People’s Houses” (“Halk Evleri”), in order to
disseminate Turkishness across Anatolia, particularly in the Kurdish region (Dickinson
2014, 121). The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign and the introduction of the People’s
Houses contributed to the radicalization of policies regarding the Kurds and the Kurdish
language, including the introduction of the “Settlement Law” (“İskân Kanunu”, Law
2733) and the “Reform Plan for the East” (“Şark Islahat Planı”), which banned the public
use of Kurdish and established standards for the resettlement of “those connected to
Turkish culture” and “those not connected to Turkish culture.” As part and parcel of these
laws, Kurds incurred fines for speaking Kurdish in public and were forcibly relocated to
other areas like Istanbul so they would speak Turkish only and conform to Turkish
cultural practices (Law 2733; Aslan 2007; Fernandes 2012; Dickinson 2014). In 1937 and
1938, the state executed an operation in the province of Dersim (later renamed Tunceli),
massacring tens of thousands of Kurdish Alevis; this operation was accompanied by the
construction of boarding schools in the area as part of what General Staff Marshal Fevzi
Çakmak called the “internal colonization” of the region (Üngör 2012, 130). One such
school—run during these years by a woman named Sıdıka Avar, supposedly chosen for
the job as a “missionary” by Atatürk himself—was populated by girls who had been
kidnapped from Kurdish villages in the region (Avar 2011; Üngör 2012). Girls at the
school had their heads shaved and were abused by the school’s staff. Though Turkish
language instruction was the priority, their curriculum also included courses on
citizenship, national security, math, cooking, housekeeping, childcare, sewing,
embroidery, and health care (Üngör 2012). In other words, the goal was to psychically,
culturally, and socially domesticate these Kurdish girls into upright Turkish citizens.
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The state continued to maintain antagonistic policies towards its linguistic minorities over
the next several decades. In 1959, a law was passed to rename villages, natural
landmarks, and other places with non-Turkish names. Over 12,000 villages, “amounting
to every third village in Turkey,” had been given new Turkish names by the year 2000
(Zeydanlıoğlu 2012, 107-9). Following the 1960 coup d’état, the military government
developed a secret report filled with proposals to “solve the problem of Kurdish
separatism and regional underdevelopment,” which reiterated previous techniques of
assimilation, such as forced resettlement and sociological/anthropological research, and
extended them into the cultural domain through an effort to translate Kurdish music into
Turkish and broadcast the music in translation (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012, 108). The 1970s saw
the radicalization of the Kurdish left in the wake of the increasing official circumscription
of the Kurdish language and Kurdish culture, culminating with the formation of the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK), a socialist group whose
goal is to liberate the Kurds from the Turkish state. After the 1980 military coup, antiKurdish policies crystallized with the creation of a new constitution that sanctified
Turkish ethnicity and the Turkish language as the fundaments of Turkish citizenship;
other laws regarding language passed during this time assert that “the mother tongue of
Turkish citizens is Turkish,” thereby performing the imagined integrity of the Turkish
nation (Law 2932). 3 In 1984, civil war broke out between the PKK and the state. From
1987 until 2002, a state of emergency was maintained in the Kurdish southeastern region
of the country, a situation that allowed for martial rule, resulting in violent practices such
as enforced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial killings. During this time, speaking
Kurdish remained a highly contentious act; Kurdish journalist İrfan Aktan has written
about how the gendarme raided villages and arrest those who owned cassettes of Kurdish
musicians like Şivan Perwer (Aktan 2013).
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, several developments helped ease the rigidity of
state discourse regarding the Kurdish question. Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, was
captured in Kenya and returned to Turkey, where he was tried and remains imprisoned.
Additionally, the rise of an Islamist political movement, most notably in the form of the
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP), as well as
Turkey’s renewed efforts to enter the European Union, eventually led the state to
acknowledge that the Kurdish question was a thorn in Turkey’s side. By 2008, the ruling
AKP government had initiated the aforementioned “Kurdish opening,” with the aim of
facilitating peace with the PKK and overcoming ethnic tensions between Turks and
Kurds.
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The Kurdish opening is a multi-scalar project that relies upon different branches of the
government and civil society to help bring Kurds into the fold of the national community.
The Religious Affairs Directorate, for example, elaborated a discourse of “religious
brotherhood” (“dinî kardeşlik”) in order to privilege religion-based kinships over national
ones (Görmez 2012). Similarly, as I described above, the Turkish Ministry of Tourism
and Culture has initiated several projects aimed at promoting cultural recognition, which
include the translation of Mem û Zîn and the creation of the state-run Kurdish language
television channel TRT Kurdî, which broadcasts news and other programming in several
dialects of Kurdish. In 2013, the government released a “Democratization Package”
(“Demokrasi Paketi”) that promised elective courses in the Kurdish language 4; an end to
the 85-year-long ban on the letters Q, W, and X, which are absent from the Turkish
alphabet but present in the Kurdish alphabet; and the allowance of political campaigns in
Kurdish and other non-Turkish languages (Law 6529). In spite of these nominal
developments, however, Welat Zeydanlıoğlu argues that “there have been no
fundamental changes of Turkey’s Kurdish policy…. Turkey’s linguicidal policy
continues” (2012, 120). This is in large part because the Turkish state continues to
persecute Kurdish scholars, politicians, activists, and organizations. Similarly, antiKurdish sentiment remains a prominent force in social and public discourse, implicitly
condoned by state officials (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012; Aktan 2014). 5
An important and frequently overlooked dynamic of this Kurdish opening is the import of
global capitalism and neoliberal forms of governance into Turkey. The AKP government
has overseen Turkey’s astral rise in the global economy; in 2008, during the global
financial crisis, the Turkish market remained relatively stable. Neoliberal
governmentality in Turkey has transfigured affective and physical geographies and the
ways that people move through those spaces and interact with one another. The roots of
this neoliberalism reach back to the 1980s: Cenk Saraçoğlu claims that former Prime
Minister Turgut Özal and his administration launched the Southeast Anatolia Project
(GAP)—an ongoing initiative aimed at developing the terrain of the Kurdish southeast
into a productive zone for the benefit of the Turkish national economy—because they
saw “the economic backwardness of Eastern Anatolia and the profound inequality
between eastern and western regions of Turkey” as at the core of the widespread dissent
in the region and as a pathologic symptom of the PKK’s rise and popularity (Saraçoğlu
2011, 89-90). 6 Here the work of culturally administering Kurds is explicitly linked with
the same work of making them productive and engaging them as economic actors. While
the translations and transformations of Mem û Zîn that I analyze below may not be
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explicit elements of GAP’s neoliberalizing work, it should nonetheless be clear that they
fit into the larger rhetoric of fixing, modernizing, and urbanizing Kurdish life-worlds
according to the state’s normative governing vision. Neoliberalism is therefore both a
symptom and a consequence of the Kurdish opening; it is a form of interpellation aimed
at producing new Kurdish subjects.
Domesticating Translation and the Power of Language
Given this history of Turkish linguistic nationalism through state policies relating to the
Kurds, as well as the centrality of Mem û Zîn to contemporary claims to Kurdish
nationhood, I now turn to the politics of translating a text like Mem û Zîn. In the
introduction to her book The Translation Zone, critical translation theorist Emily Apter
writes: “as an act of disruption, translation becomes a means of repositioning the subject
in the world and in history; a means of rendering self-knowledge foreign to itself; a way
of denaturalizing citizens, taking them out of the comfort zone of national space, daily
ritual, and pre-given domestic arrangements…. Translation is a significant medium of
subject re-formation and political change” (Apter 2005, 6). Apter further argues that the
way we understand and conceive translation after the September 11 attacks has
fundamentally changed, that translation has become a tool for warfare and in particular
for counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency as a technique of war compels the
counterinsurgent to understand the insurgent better than the insurgent understands itself.
Translation, as a technique of transforming and domesticating knowledge, thus becomes
a way of enacting domination over the cultural and linguistic other. 7
The state-commissioned translation of Mem û Zîn published in 2010 was written based on
an original handwritten manuscript located in the Istanbul Archaeology Museum; a
facsimile of this manuscript is published in the translation, on the left pages, opposite the
Latinate Kurdish transposition and the Turkish translation on the right. The presence of
the antique, handwritten manuscript of Mem û Zîn in the state archive, as well as the
state’s capacity to translate it, to know and apprehend it in its entirety, attests to a
particular governmental logic that resonates with Ann Stoler’s relational conception of
the archive and governmentality. Because the archive is a site for the accumulation of
cultural texts and artifacts—of knowledge itself—it is not enough to look at archival
documents as representative of a particular moment in history. Instead, we have to read
the presence of such documents “along the archival grain,” making sense of them
according to the governmental logics that expropriated them into the archive in the first
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place (Stoler 2002, 100). I therefore read the state’s translation of Mem û Zîn as a kind of
archival counterinsurgency, an effort to actively dispossess Mem û Zîn of its historicity
and to domesticate it into a repertoire of Turkish multiculturalism.
The translated text features a preface by former Minister of Tourism and Culture,
Ertuğrul Günay, condemning the “repressive mindset” (“yasakçı zihniyet”) of the past,
constellating Mem û Zîn within world literature, and claiming that this translation is
useful “in terms of reflecting and documenting Turkey’s deep-rooted, pluralist, historical,
written, and intellectual reservoir” (“Türkiye’nin köklü, çoğulcu, tarihsel, yazınsal, ve
düşünsel birikimini yansıtmak ve belgelemek bakımından”) (Xanî 2010, i-ii). This
humanistic claim stands in stark contrast to the violent discourse on Kurds that defines
much of the Republican era, while extending and affirming the historicity and territorial
integrity of the Turkish nation-state. It also exemplifies the use of historiography-ascounterinsurgency, the dynamic of governmentality that I described above. Furthermore,
that the Minister of Tourism and Culture regards the text as a testament to the strength of
pluralist democracy in Turkey even as the text’s translator reinforces a discourse that
denies the legitimacy of the Kurdish language gestures toward an incongruous and
ambivalent dynamic of neoliberal governance that I will attempt to unfold: that of the
ever-present and ever-absent specter.
The Ministry of Tourism and Culture selected Namık Açıkgöz, a professor at Muğla
University, to translate Mem û Zîn. Notably, Açıkgöz does not speak Kurdish, and his
academic articles have primarily been written on Ottoman divan poetry between the 15th
and 18th centuries (Açıkgöz 2014). In one such article from 2007, Açıkgöz asserts that
there is very little Kurdish in the text: “The Kurdish version of Mem u Zin bears a
linguistic particularity that frequently arouses the impression of being Farsi. Ahmed-i
Hânî says that the work is written in the Kurmancî dialect [of Kurdish]. However, in the
work, outside of 25-30 verbs and a similar number of prepositions and other elements, the
majority of the words are filled with elements of Farsi and Arabic” (2007, 39). Açıkgöz
reiterated these claims in a 2010 interview for the online newspaper Haber Vaktim. In the
interview, Açıkgöz asserts “Within the framework of my findings, Kurdish is a dialect of
Farsi,” reinstantiating a long genealogy within state discourse on the Kurdish language
that regards Kurdish as either non-existent or a perverse dialect somewhere between Farsi
and Turkish (2010a). In a book-length rebuttal to Açıkgöz’s translation, Kurdish scholar
Kadri Yıldırım challenges this assertion with a quantitative analysis of the text: out of
26,560 words, claims Yıldırım, 19,601 (74%) of them are Kurdish, 6,015 (23%) are
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Arabic, 918 (3% are Farsi), and 26 (less than 1%) are Turkish (2011, 9). While we should
of course be wary of the notion that words are fixed essentially, timelessly, and
exclusively to a particular language, the disparity between the figures is a telling
indication that the degree to which Mem û Zîn can be called Kurdish is a politicized and
contentious topic.
A scholar of Kurdish language and literature in the “Living Languages and Literatures”
Department at Mardin Artuklu University, Yıldırım’s 200-page rebuttal, titled A Critical
Approach to the Culture Ministry’s Translation of Mem û Zîn, illustrates not only that
Açıkgöz committed a number of rather glaring errors in his translation, but also that he
took a significant amount of his translation from the 1968 translation done by Mehmed
Emîn Bozarslan. Yıldırım laments the selection of Namık Açıkgöz as translator, given
that a number of clearly stronger candidates (such as Zeynel Abidin Zinar and Selim
Temo) were recommended to the Ministry. According to the press release announcing
Namık Açıkgöz’s selection as translator, the Ministry chose him “with great care”
(“büyük hassasiyetle”) (Yıldırim 2011, 8). As Yıldırım notes in the book, it is difficult to
emphasize just how significant it is for the state to be sponsoring and publishing a
masterpiece of classical Kurdish literature; his disappointment, which “increased the
more that I read of the book,” compelled him to write the rebuttal (203). Furthermore,
Yıldırım limits his analysis to the first 30 chapters, claiming that there were so many
mistakes and cases of plagiarism in the Açıkgöz translation that, “in order to keep our
book from being too long, we did not provide any examples from the last 30 chapters of
the book” (113).
In addition to extensively plagiarizing Bozarslan’s translation, Açıkgöz also fills in the
lines that had been censored in Bozarslan’s translation. Açıkgöz has never translated a
Kurdish text before, and his expertise in the realm of classical Ottoman literature relates
only tangentially to the classical Kurdish of Ehmedê Xanî. In addition to securing a
native Kurdish-speaking undergraduate student who would “provide me with his views
about the Kurdish language,” Açıkgöz also tells readers in his translator’s introduction
that “I drew on the M. E. Bozarslan translation [M. E. Bozarslan yayımından istifade
edilmiştir] for couplets that were difficult to comprehend” (Xanî iv). A comparative
analysis of Açıkgöz’s translation and Bozarslan’s translation shows just to what degree
Açıkgöz had difficulty comprehending the Kurdish couplets: in one chapter consisting of
90 lines, 41 of those lines are identical to Bozarslan’s translation, slightly altered
Bozarslan’s word order, or have one word replaced with a close synonym. This chapter is
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not an anomaly, either: Kadri Yıldırım notes over 400 lines in the first 30 chapters that
are identical in the Bozarslan and Açıkgöz translations (Yıldırım 2011). Furthermore, 24
lines had been left out of Bozarslan’s translation—forcibly cut out of the text by censors
because they contained the most controversial passages concerning Kurdish political and
cultural community—that are now present in Açıkgöz’s. In other words, what the state
had forcibly suppressed from Bozarslan’s translation (a genealogy of/for Kurdish
nationalism) are recuperated in the Açıkgöz translation, itself commissioned by the state.
The broad plagiarization of Bozarslan’s translation is particularly significant because
Bozarslan faced extensive trials for attempting to publish his translation of Mem û Zîn
(van Bruinessen 2013). Consequently, we can see that Açıkgöz’s reappropriation of
Bozarslan’s intellectual labor and political commitment to the Kurdish movement is more
than mere plagiarism. It is an attempt to extend the state’s domain over narratives of
Kurdish cultural resistance in order to disarm the intellectual genealogies of Kurdish
literature and deploy them within a new tradition of Turkish multiculturalism. We can
also see this by looking at the way Açıkgöz characterizes the value of his translation.
In interviews given during the press junket aimed at promoting the translation, Açıkgöz
spoke about the peace process in Turkey and provided his perspective on how Mem û Zîn
should and should not be read. According to Açıkgöz, the only proper reading of Mem û
Zîn is one that privileges the elements of Sufi mysticism and cherishes the love and the
tragedy of the two lovers (2010b). Not only, he claims, is a nationalist reading of the text
entirely misleading, but such a reading is insidious and threatening: “So what if a text like
this is Turkish, so what if it’s Kurdish? If you look at this text in an ideological way
because of its language, then of course the other side is also going to become ideological”
(2010b). Language, for Açıkgöz, is therefore a sterile set of traffic signs that direct a
reader toward the intention of the author, which in his reading is a message of Sufic love.
He continues, “Mem u Zin [sic] has become a buzz word [iki lafından biri] for separatist
organizations… As if anti-religious Marxist-Leninist ideologies have anything in
common with the content of Mem u Zin” (2010b). Ehmedê Xanî, as we have seen, is
quite explicit about why he decided to write Mem û Zîn in Kurdish (he even titles a
chapter of the poem “Reasons for writing the book in this language”), and he also links
the use of the language to the political conditions of his time, calling for resistance
against the Ottomans, the Arabs, the Persians, and the Tajiks by using both “the pen” and
“the sword.” Furthermore, Xanî writes that he wants to use the story of Mem û Zîn as a
“pretext” (“behane”) to “expound upon the trouble in [his] heart” (1996, 186).
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My point here is neither to justify a nationalist reading of the text nor to disqualify a
reading that focuses on its Sufic tropes. Rather, I am interested in the ways that Açıkgöz
and the state at large attempt to supplant a nationalist reading with a Sufic (Islamist) one
in order to domesticate the text and disarm it as a political object in the public sphere. In
another article, Açıkgöz asserts that “of course literary texts are written in a language
used by a person; however, in these kinds of works, language cannot go beyond being a
mere unit of communication. In other words, literary texts actually do not have a
language; they are the shared holdings [ortak malı] of humanity” (2010c). It is telling that
Açıkgöz frames Mem û Zîn and literature writ large in terms consistent with commodity
fetishism. For the AKP, as I described above, neoliberal democracy converges at the
intersection of capitalism and multiculturalism with the intent of inducting a new citizensubject whose practices of identification are inconsequential so long as s/he abides by and
abets the material and cultural accumulation of resources.
Açıkgöz extends this metaphor of language as “holding”, comparing the book Mem û Zîn
to raw material and natural resources: “It is especially important that Mem û Zîn was
published by the state. As much as the minerals under this earth are ours; as much as
everything atop this earth is ours; the loves and the sadnesses, the crying and the laughing
of this earth are also ours. Our human spirit is in every love and every story nourished by
this earth. Just like in Mem u Zin [sic]” (2010c). For Açıkgöz, as for the state, Mem û Zîn
and the Kurdish language at large are akin to the minerals under the earth: raw materials
that have been a natural fixture of the region for all time, but that nonetheless need to be
refined, converted, transformed, and translated into usable goods for consumption.
Indeed, as he says, it is especially important that Mem û Zîn was published by the state,
whose institutional politics of representation mediate social relationships and ways of
being accordingly. The publication is also a symbolic gesture that attempts to displace
and disappear the histories of violence and denial that the Kurds have been subject to up
until only very recently.
Açıkgöz’s conception of language as interchangeable pieces in the machinery of
literature is decidedly informed by capitalist notions of language, and is in keeping with
more formal state discourse on the topic: former Prime Minister Erdoğan, in his inaugural
address for the state-run Kurdish language television channel, asserts that “Language, for
me, is an envelope. What matters is the message inside” (Erdoğan 2009). Understanding
language as a system of vessels to bear productive messages extends capitalism into
language, whereby words become as though the interchangeable parts of a machine
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producing commodified goods and ideas. They are the weaponry with which the Turkish
state is waging a cultural counterinsurgency. Rather than indicating an end to the civil
war, these translations are part of a larger apparatus that perpetuates the conflict, masking
it behind practices of “dense semantic maintenance” aimed at managing discourse and
social psychology (Pratt 2009, 1524). Such translations erase histories of domination,
while enacting those same forms of domination made possible by such histories.
Multiculturalism and Affective Geographies in the Shadow of Mem û Zîn
On January 1, 2009, the state-run Kurdish-language channel TRT 6 was inaugurated on
Turkish television. The on-air opening ceremony began with the playing of the Turkish
national anthem and the raising of the Turkish flag. At 7:00 PM that evening, former
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivered a special pre-recorded speech to the
channel’s viewers. In the speech, delivered (primarily) in Turkish and dubbed in Kurdish,
Erdoğan describes the channel as “the free voice of democracy [that] will glorify
humanistic values, will nourish peace and calm, will not be separatist or exclusionary but
unifying, and will contribute to the development and the deepening of democracy.” He
ends the speech with a phrase in Kurdish that translates as “Best of luck to TRT 6” (“TRT
6 bi xêr be”).
Erdoğan’s speech to inaugurate TRT 6, now known as TRT Kurdî, traffics in the
conventional language of the Republic, which is centered around notions of unity,
oneness, and indissolubility. Yet the speech also offers a glimpse into the discourses of
governmentality that structure the Kurdish opening: TRT Kurdî is intended to promote
the values of proper citizenship and to interpellate Kurdish viewers into a multicultural
Turkish nation, and in so doing, TRT Kurdî is intended to manage and contain dissent.
Erdoğan’s linguistic switch at the end of his speech acts as a metonym for these new
forms of governmentality, exemplifying the way in which the Kurdish language has
become a tool for communicating and sustaining the Turkish nation. Much like the 2010
translation of Mem û Zîn into Turkish, then, TRT Kurdî and its programs are a platform
for counterinsurgency.
I will now analyze an adaptation of Mem û Zîn that aired on the channel between 2012
and 2013. The show, titled In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn (“Siya Mem û Zîn”), is a
contemporary reimagining of Ehmedê Xanî’s tale, in which Mem is studying engineering
in Istanbul and Zîn is educated and headstrong, with a passion for horseback riding. I will
examine some key scenes in order to explore how In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn
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reimagines ethnic kinship and the geographies of Kurdish belonging. Then, I will
examine the public reception and circulation of the show, a discursive repertoire that
constitutes the show’s paratext, i.e. the framing narratives and representations that
interpellate the text, ensuring its reception by the viewing public. Understanding the
institutional politics of text and paratext “reveals cultural agency and operates as a
renegotiation of the past in the public domain and a reidentification of individuals from
the same geographic origin as kin” (Iğsız 2007, 169). The notion of geographic kinship
posited by Mem û Zîn, imbricated with discourses of multiculturalism, conjures a neoOttoman rhetoric in order to stage a heritage revival and an anachronistic history of
supposed Ottoman concord and tolerance. According to the governmental logic of TRT
Kurdî, built upon this neo-Ottoman multiculturalism, the Turkish state hopes to seize
upon insurgent Kurdish subjectivities and remake them into upright citizens constellated
within a multicultural Turkish nation (Young 2010, 147). TRT Kurdî transforms Kurdish
cultural artifacts like Mem û Zîn into weapons, deploying them as a domesticating force
against unruly Kurdish subjectivities.
The first episode of In The Shadow of Mem and Zîn, premiering on 27 February 2012,
opens with an image of Mem asleep in a minibus on his way back to his village in the
mountains. He is dreaming of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year celebration, of people
dancing govend around a bonfire, when in the distance a hazy and dark figure appears.
We only see her eyes before she turns and flees through the snowy forest. Mem chases
after her, and when she finally turns around, Mem reaches out to remove the veil hiding
the rest of her face before he is awoken by another passenger: the minibus is approaching
a gendarme checkpoint in the mountain. The gendarme, speaking in Turkish, stop the
minibus, make all of the passengers disembark, and check all of their identification
papers: there is a close-up of Mem’s distinctly recognizable Turkish government-issued
ID. Upon the commander’s order, the passengers re-board the bus and continue on the
road.
The gendarme checkpoint is an all-too-familiar experience for people who have lived in
and traveled through Turkish Kurdistan, and its continued institutionalization and
routinization in the region exemplifies the ongoing symbolic and physical violence
wrought by the Turkish state. Consequently, it is striking that the television show begins
in this way: no longer are we located in Xanî’s semi-fictionalized, timeless, Cizira Botan
in the heart of Kurdistan. Instead, our story is unfolding in the contemporary geography
of the Republic of Turkey, thereby crystallizing the integrity of Turkish territory and the
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Kurds’ place within it. Not only do the passengers in the minibus understand Turkish, but
because the gendarmes’ Turkish commands are not subtitled, it is also presumed that the
audience should and will know Turkish as well. By presuming the soft multilingualism of
its Kurdish viewers, the program aids and abets technologies of linguistic
homogenization that conform Kurdish to the common communicative framework of the
multicultural Turkish nation (Noorani 2013). The program is therefore elaborating a
Turkified Kurdish subjectivity, one that complies with the Turkish state and its forces,
even as it is still trafficking in the literature of Kurdish nationalism and belonging.
Over the course of the series, Mem and Zîn’s relationship faces similar challenges to the
ones that arise in Xanî’s book. The strains on Mem and Zîn’s relationship are a microscale staging of the geopolitical tensions that have shaped and continue to animate the
Kurdish question in Turkey. While in Xanî’s rendition Mem and Zîn can never be
together because they represent the two incommensurable parts of a Kurdistan divided
between empires, In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn frames the stakes of their relationship in
slightly different ways. To be sure, Mem and Zîn cannot have a happy ending: to give
them that would corroborate the allegory between the consummation of their love and the
territorial realization of Kurdistan as a political unit. However, the show does not
conclude with the death of Mem and Zîn, as Xanî’s tale does. Instead, in the finale of the
show, just after Zîn collapses and dies from grief, Zîn’s sister Sitî emerges with a baby
she had with Mem’s friend Tajdîn. As everyone weeps, Sitî holds the newborn child next
to Zîn’s body, and the screen fades to black. In the next and final scene, which takes
place several years later, Sitî and Tajdîn are going with their daughter to the grave that
holds Mem and Zîn. Sitî calls the child by her name—Zîn—and they sit beside the grave
and weep as Sitî kisses the rings that once belonged to Mem and Zîn. Their ghosts appear
behind the grave, clad in white, before the scene closes with a shot of the grave, and we
watch a final montage of the pivotal moments of Mem and Zîn’s relationship over the
course of the show (Siya Mem û Zîn ep. 56, 2013).
The creative liberties taken with the conclusion of the plot should be understood as more
than the mere contingencies of adapting for the genre of television drama. What is Sitî’s
daughter—named Zîn, no less—supposed to represent? What does the show stand to gain
from trafficking in ghosts? The performative gesture of naming Sitî’s daughter Zîn is a
promise that Zîn-as-allegory—the Zîn that is half of Kurdistan—will endure as a
nominal, disembodied, and dehistoricized entity: it is a guarantee that Zîn’s plight, her
desire for consummation, is a mere shadow of the past. This fracture, between the Zîn of
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the past and the Zîn of the present, is corroborated by the apparition of Mem and Zîn as
ghosts, smiling at Sitî, Tajdîn, and little Zîn. In this regard, the name of the show, In The
Shadow of Mem û Zîn, is particularly apt. It is no longer the story of an impossible
Kurdistan—this Kurdistan has become a memory, a ghost—but one of an ever more
probable Turkey.
Upon its release, In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn was framed by pro-government
newspapers like Yeni Şafak and Akşam as “reflecting Turkey’s mosaic” and “[having]
united all of Turkey,” and politicians who attended the show’s release gala praised the
show for its significance as a conciliatory gesture. A few months after the show’s
premiere, the show released a photograph of the cast and crew as a group with the title
“We are Turkey” and captioned with “Important Kurdish Sufi mystic Ahmed-i Hani’s
[sic] great work Mem u Zin has united all of Turkey. From Turk to Kurd, Georgian to
Circassian, Albanian to Laz, the entire crew of Siya Mem u Zin is working up a sweat to
make the show a success” (İnal 2012). In the image, each individual cast/crew member is
identified, along with his or her ethnicity and geographic origin. Thus, rather than
rendering identificatory signifiers as insignificant, this image circumscribes them as
descriptors that modify, qualify, and adhere closely to one’s Turkishness. Instead of
challenging identity politics, the image then valorizes and refines practices of
differentiation, taxonomization, and categorization. The filiation of acceptable kinds of
citizenry—“from Turk to Kurd, Georgian to Circassian, Albanian to Laz”—is
accompanied by the filiation and expansion of technologies for governmentality.
In conjunction with the image, several of the main actors, the director, and the producer
wrote short blurbs published in the Sabah newspaper about their ethnic identities. The
producer, Aytekin Mert, states, “nobody [on the crew] is uncomfortable because of
anyone else’s ethnic identity or religious affiliation. We meet on the common
denominator of being human and being citizens of Turkey.” Similarly, the director of the
show, Yusuf Güven, states that “what I learned from this photograph is that even if
languages, religions, and ethnic roots are different, the language of brotherhood is also
universal.” These claims, which along with the photograph, make up part of the show’s
paratextual repertoire, carefully resignify non-Turkish identities through the rhetoric of
multicultural intimacy and humanist belonging, whitewashing the histories of violence
and inequality that marginalized and disenfranchised such identities in the first place.
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These cosmopolitan discourses produce a cognitive dissonance amid the ongoing state
violence in the Kurdistan region. Xanî’s version of the story of Mem and Zîn takes place
in the Kurdish town of Cizre, and indeed, the tomb of the two lovers is a tourist
destination. The town of Cizre is also a hotbed for political resistance and activity, with
protests on behalf of the forcibly disappeared Kurds taking place every Saturday. In
December of 2011, a few months before the premiere of In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn,
the Turkish Air Force bombed a group of villagers in Roboskî, located in the mountains
of Cizre, killing 35 of them (İnsan Hakları Derneği 2012). It is painfully ironic that the
state deployed its adaptation of Mem û Zîn as a testament to pluralism in Turkey even as
its ongoing use of systematic violence transforms the real-life setting of the story into a
warzone. Ultimately, In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn is a useful prism for examining the
techniques of governmentality unfolding within the Kurdish opening and the ongoing
peace process. This coercive reconciliation uses the Kurdish language to resignify
Kurdish cultural artifacts, exemplifying a phenomenon we might call the
counterinsurgent potential of translation.
Conclusion: Insurgent Specters
In an article on linguistic warfare, Vicente L. Rafael argues that although
counterinsurgent translation “detains” its recipients, it also “brings forth the
untranslatable, calling us to respond to what cannot be converted and contained, to what,
however minor and marginal, evades even as it is constantly menaced by imperial
evocations” (2012, 77). The power of translation to detain us within a realm of meaning
and to simultaneously bring forth the untranslatable suggests that the work of linguistic
counterinsurgency is the precise dilemma that emerges from the Turkish government’s
efforts to fix the meaning of Kurdish texts and identities.
Historically, the field of Kurdish cultural production was beyond the state’s regulatory
capacity because of the state’s obstinate refusal to acknowledge the existence of Kurds or
the Kurdish language. Instead the field was subject to intense, violent forms of physical,
psychic, and symbolic erasure. The recognition of Kurdish identity and the Kurdish
language as potentially valid forms of social being—under the neoliberalization of the
state’s relationship to society—nonetheless opened the way for the state to regulate,
discipline, and domesticate those selfsame forms of being. By seizing upon the Kurdish
language as a governmental vector, a weapon for counterinsurgency, the Turkish
government has attempted to expropriate the very terrain of the fields of Kurdish cultural
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production, socialization, and existence. Here, capitalism is joined with Turkish
nationalism to materially and spiritually dispossess the Kurds, transforming Kurdistan
into a geography of ghosts, a socioeconomic space that relies critically on Kurdish
material and cultural production even as attempts to make its producers disappear (Roy
2014). The state project of dispossession aims to regulate existing discursive structures in
order to compel those who speak the Kurdish language to be the agents of their own
abjection and dispossession.
Meanwhile, the project of fixing a stable identity for the Kurdish other is never complete.
Identity is always under construction, and consequently, it is perpetually a site for the
contestation of the state’s interpellative project. As an ideal form constituted by
difference, Turkish national identity is perpetually haunted by the Kurdish other that it
has sought to domesticate and subsume (Vali 2002, 69). In the case of Mem û Zîn, the
state has consigned its nationalist currency to historical erasure. Its state-sanctioned
translation and adaptation constitute an archival counterinsurgency: a willful remaking of
history into the narrative of domination. Yet, the text resists this domestication: the
nationalist message makes its perpetual return as a specter that haunts its translations
across language and genre. This message is an untranslatable, evasive, “seething
presence” that detains the governmental project of the Turkish state (Gordon 1997, 8).
The reappearance of the ghostly other is therefore an inevitable condition of the
structures of feeling that exercise power in the state: indeed, as Jacques Derrida tells us in
Specters of Marx, “haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony” (1994, 46). The
political potential of this haunting resides in its capacity to render visible the cracks in the
hegemonies of neoliberalism and nationalism in Turkey. Conjured by the state’s
technologies of counterinsurgency, the specter circulates as an inassimilable insurgent, an
affect of resistance, the kernel of alternative social imaginings: it draws us beyond the
political exigencies of the present to imagine the possibilities of other temporal and
cultural worlds. Tracing the specter’s return allows us to recuperate the autonomy of the
linguistic and cultural other, to give it new life.
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1

Xanî does not use these identificatory signifiers in a contemporary fashion. Indeed, his
descriptions do not correlate to the notions we have today of state, ethnicity, history, and
power.
2

The International Journal of the Sociology of Language published an issue in 2012
titled “The Kurdish Linguistic Landscape: Vitality, Linguicide, and Resistance,” edited
by Jaffer Sheyholislami, Amir Hassanpour, and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas. This issue was
tremendously helpful for my research, and several of the articles (Fernandes; Öpengin;
Üngör; Zeydanlıoğlu) go into much greater detail on the history and dynamics of the
Kurdish language in Turkey.
3

In 1981, the Turkish Parliament passed Law 2932, titled “Law Regarding Publications
Made in Languages Other Than Turkish,” with the intent of forbidding the use of the
Kurdish language. However, because official doctrine denied the very existence of the
Kurdish language, the law could not expressly forbid Kurdish. Instead, the prohibition on
Kurdish is achieved in a rather bizarre circumscription: “It is forbidden to express,
disseminate, or publish thoughts in any language other than the first official languages of
states recognized by the Turkish State.” The logical absurdity of this clause belies the
ambivalence of the state’s approach to Kurds: the fierce and totalizing prohibition of
something which, in the official imaginary, isn’t supposed to exist.
4

The letters Q, W, and X were implicitly forbidden by the 1928 “Law Concerning the
Acceptance and Implementation of Turkish Letters,” (“Türk Harflerinin Kabul ve Tatbiki
Hakkında Kanun”). For more, see Ömer Şahin’s article in Radikal, “‘Q, W, X’in” 85
yıllık yasağı bitiyor,” 27 September 2013. Link.
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5

As recently as September 2014, a young Kurdish man in the region of Antalya was
killed by a Turkish nationalist on the grounds that he was speaking Kurdish in public
(Aktan 2014).
6

GAP gained new political currency with the AKP’s Kurdish opening but also
engendered significant controversy for several of its planned projects. According to the
GAP website, “the project’s basic objectives include the improvement of living standards
and income levels of people so as to eliminate regional development disparities and
contributing to such national goals as social stability and economic growth by enhancing
productivity and employment opportunities in the rural sector.” Similarly, the main
objectives of the GAP Action Plan (which aims to accelerate the achievement of GAP’s
goals) are “Implementing economic development, ensuring social development,
improving infrastructure, and developing institutional capacity.” For more, see “GAP
Nedir?”, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, Link; see also “GAP EP Nedir?”, GAP Eylem
Planı, Link.
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Most writing about translation as a tool for counterinsurgency has focused upon the
actual experience of translating in zones of active conflict (Apter 2005; Pratt 2009;
Rafael 2012). Here I am interested in techniques of counterinsurgency that extend beyond
such zones of active conflict and into the lives of people who are not involved in such
active conflict. Because counterinsurgency depends upon the pursuit of full knowledge of
the insurgent, culturally and otherwise, in order to disarm her, we should also examine
how the work of counterinsurgency is taking place outside of the battlefield.
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